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Abstract:
Empirical evidence shows that vertically integrated producers are more productive, bigger and
are matched to better suppliers (with high productivity and size). I present a dynamic stochastic
model of an industry with heterogeneous rms interacting as buyers and sellers, and market
frictions that induce a hold-up problem to the manufacturers to account for these facts. In the
model economy, an industrial structure emerges as the result of optimal investment decisions that
rms undertake under uncertainty. Firms choose whether to integrate, link to external sellers
or buy inputs in the market. This theoretical environment provides a natural framework to
answer several questions: Why do supply relations vary across industries and across rms within
industries? Why arent all large rms vertically integrated? How do changes in the properties of
uncertainty at rm level determine di¤erences in the vertical structure of an industry? We nd
that higher uncertainty is associated with higher likelihood of outsourcing; vertically integrated
rms are larger and more e¢ cient; otherwise identical downstream rms may di¤er in their
vertical structure, and those that are vertically integrated can end up disintegrated or remain
integrated. We also analyze the e¤ects of changes in costs of vertical integration and outsourcing
on welfare, aggregate output and productivity.
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1 Introduction
The organization of economic activity has been a eld of extensive research in economics. This
literature, which goes back to the seminal paper by Coase (1937), has focused on the scope of
the market versus the rm. Since then, important contributions on transaction cost economics
and contract theory have been emphasizing the role of transaction costs, asset specicity, supply
uncertainty, incomplete contracting, market power and regulation on vertical integration.3 These
models, however are silent about rm dynamics. This is in contrast with new evidence, by
Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009), which shows that there is a close relationship between the vertical
structure of rms and key determinants (size and productivity) of the dynamic behavior of
producers. In particular, vertically integrated producers are more productive, bigger and are
matched to better suppliers (with high productivity and size). Similarly, there is a large empirical
and theoretical literature on rm dynamics studying size distribution of rms, turnover, mobility
and productivity, among other issues.4 ;5 Given the lack of data, however, this literature has
abstracted from the vertical relations rms optimally choose. This is the gap the current model
tries to ll.
Introducing endogenous vertical structure decisions (i.e. vertical integration versus out-
sourcing) into industry equilibrium has implications for key variables of interest, such as size
distributions, turnover, etc. For example, vertical integration (we refer to it as VI), in contrast
with outsourcing, allows rms to avoid hold-up problems, transactions costs, and cost uctu-
3The literature, at the broadest level, has considered the following perspectives on vertical integration: agency
theory articles include Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Holmstrom (1982); transaction costs theory research
includes Williamson (1979); and the references for the property right theory are Grossman and Hart (1986) and
Hart and Moore (1990). Gibbons (2005) provides a summary and a comparison of these theories. The most recent
surveys include Joskow (2005) and Lafontaine and Slade (2007). Recent theoretical and empirical research on the
study of the determinants and e¤ects of vertical integration within and across industries include McLaren (2000),
Grossman and Helpman (2002), Antras (2003), Acemoglu et al. (2004) and (2005), Novak and Stern (2007a,b),
Ciliberto and Panzar (2009), Legros and Newman (2009) and Gibbons, Holden and Powell (2010).
4Empirical research documents stylized facts on entry, exit, growth, and the size distribution of rms: Manseld
(1962); Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) and (1999a,b); Davis and Haltiwanger (1992); Sutton (1997);
Caves (1998); Bartelsman, Scarpetta, and Schivardi (2003); Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004); Axtel
(2001); Foster Haltiwanger and Kirzan (2001); Cabral and Mata (2003); Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006); Foster,
Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008); Bernard, Redding and Scott (2009); and Hsieh and Klenow (2009); among
others.
5The theoretical work on industry dynamics tries to provide interpretations of the observed heterogeneity
across individual producers: Simon and Bonini (1958); Lucas (1978); Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992 a,b);
Ericson and Pakes (1995); Pakes and Ericson (1998); Cooley and Quadrini (2001); Melitz (2003); Albuquerque
and Hopenhayn (2004); Klette and Kortum (2004); Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006); Luttmer (2007); Asplund
and Nocke (2007), Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007); Hopenhayn and Vereshchagina (2009); and Chatterjee and
Rossi-Hansberg (2011); among others.
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ations; and insure specialized input procurement, but also increases managerial costs. Thus,
di¤erences in costs and benets in VI across industries may have an impact on rmsprotabil-
ity and survival, determining di¤erences in size distribution of rms and average productivity
of an industry.
This paper builds a long run dynamic entry and exit equilibrium model of heterogeneous
upstream (suppliers) and downstream (manufacturers) rms and market frictions that induce
a hold-up problem to the manufacturers. Firms choose whether to integrate, link to external
sellers or buy inputs in the market. An industrial structure is the result of optimal investment
decisions that rms undertake under uncertainty. In this environment, we seek to understand
the determinants of the new stylized facts characterizing the vertical relations of rms. Several
questions naturally arise in this environment: Why does the share of vertically integrated rms
di¤er across industries and across rms within industries? How is the vertical structure of rms
and industries endogenously determined? What are the implications of rms vertical structure
on the size distribution of rms, the rms turnover and the rms value? Why arent all large
rms vertically integrated? How do changes in the stochastic process (i.e. persistence) governing
the uncertainty at rm level determine di¤erences in the vertical structure of an industry (i.e.,
the share of vertically integrated rms)? This paper focus on these questions.
Our results show that, consistent with the facts presented by Hortacsu and Syverson (2009),
vertically integrated are larger and more productive. Furthermore, more productive manufac-
turers tend to integrate with more productive manufacturers. The productivity process of the
manufacturers as well as the cost of vertical relations play a key role in the model. We show
that when the productivity shocks for manufacturers are less persistent, i.e. there is more un-
certainty, the fraction of vertically integrated manufacturers decline. This is consistent with
the evidence provided by Kranton and Meinhart (2000). Hence the observed di¤erence in the
level of idiosyncratic risk across industry, as documented by Castro, Clementi and MacDonald
(2009), are likely to play an important role in vertical relations within industries.
The current paper is related to two literature. First, it introduces vertical relations into
industry dynamics models (see Hopenhayn 1992 and Hopenhayn H., and R. Rogerson 1993).
Second, it is related to recent papers that study how di¤erent organizational forms might emerge
as optimal decisions by the rms. In particular, McLaren (2000) and Grossman and Helpman
(2002) propose frameworks of incomplete contracting in which nal goods manufacturers decide
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whether to outsource production of intermediate goods or produce them in-house. The key factor
determining the organizational structure is the externality e¤ect yielding the thickness of the
market for inputs: The more other nal goods manufacturers choose to outsource productions
of intermediate goods, the more attractive it becomes for one manufacturer to do so as well.
These papers, however, consider homogenous producers who decide on their vertical relations
within a static environment without any shocks.
1.1 Facts on Vertical Integration
Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009) show that VI status is related to di¤erences in establishment
types for the U.S economy.6 As Table 1 shows, vertically integrated establishments are larger on
average. Between 1977 and 1997 vertically integrated plants constitute relatively small fraction,
8 to 9.5 percent, of all establishments of the economy (row 4). Focusing only on multi-unit
establishments, vertically integrated plants account for roughly 35 to 40 percent of these multi-
unit businesses (row1/row2). Despite their modest share of the overall number of establishments,
vertically integrated businesses account for a much larger employment share, 25-30 percent, and
roughly half of multi-unit employment (last row).
Table 1: Aggregate Patterns of Vertical Integration, 1977-1997
Non-farm Private Economy
Year 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997
VI Establishments (thousands) 384.3 421.7 546.7 519.8 549.3
Multi-unit establishments (thousands) 1033.7 1167.0 1336.8 1476.6 1605.6
Total establishments (thousands) 4862.2 5049.8 5855.5 6253.2 6831.1
VI establishment share (percent) 7.9 8.4 9.4 8.3 8.0
VI employment (millions) 20.4 21.5 26.9 26.5 28.3
Multi-unit employment (millions) 38.2 42.7 48.3 53.9 60.7
Total employment (millions) 68.1 75.7 87.7 93.6 106.1
VI employment (percent) 29.8 28.4 30.7 28.3 26.7
Source: Taken from Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007).
6 In order to state if a rm is VI rst they determine the industry a¢ liation of every establishment in the
Economic Census (EC), using the Input-Output Industry Classication System (IOIC) by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (EC contains SIC codes so they reclassify it into IOIC). Second, they identify in which industry rms
operate. Third, they verify whether any substantial links are present between pairs of industries based on volume
trade ows using 1987 I-O Tables: a substantial link exists between an industry A and any other industry if A
buys at least ve percent of its intermediate materials, or any other industry to which A sells at least 5% of its
output. Finally, they nd all establishments that the rm owns on both ends of a substantial vertical link and
classify them as being vertically integrated.
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Therefore, vertically integrated establishments are larger on average than single-unit busi-
nesses or non-integrated multi-units. Furthermore, the share of plants that are vertically in-
tegrated increases with plants within-industry size percentiles. While smallest plants in an
industry are almost never integrated, 7 percent of the median-sized plant are integrated, and 67
percent of plants in the top percentile of their industry size distribution are integrated.
Figure 1 presents the size densities at rm level. It can be seen that central tendencies are
clearly di¤erent: vertically integrated rms are the largest on average and their distribution is
more skewed. Their size dominates, in rst order stochastic dominance (FOSD) sense, to the
size of not vertically integrated manufacturers. Notice that there is an overlap among these
distributions (rms with the same employment levels have di¤erent vertical status).
Figure 1: Firm Size Distributions for Multi-Unit Firms, 1997.
Source: Taken from Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009).
Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009) also present a conditional analysis where they regress plants
observables types like size, productivity, and factor intensities (all of them related to plant
survival) on an indicator for plantsintegration status and a set of control variables (including
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industry by year xed e¤ects). The results show that, besides being larger, vertically integrated
producers display higher productivity levels (they are on average 40 percent more productive
than their unintegrated industry cohorts). Moreover, they investigate why plants have these
characteristics and conclude that vertically integrated plants are more productive, larger, and
more capital intensive primarily because they were either born into integrated structures that
way, or because rms with vertically integrated structures that choose to expand through mergers
or acquisitions do so by incorporating existing plants that are also of high-type.
Kranton and Minehart (2000) study the relationship between the vertical structure of rms
and idiosyncratic uncertainty in demand, putting special emphasis in a special case of vertical
relation, networks (an intermediate level of organization between VI and markets). In the last
few decades the importance of input procurement by manufacturer-supplier exchange networks
has increased a lot.7 Therefore, Kranton and Minehart (2000) study the conditions under which
industries are likely to be organized as networks.
In their model, manufacturers can decide to build a dedicated asset to produce their own
inputs, or they can invest in links to external sellers from which they buy specialized inputs
or, alternatively, they get inputs from arm-length markets. The results indicate that there is
a connection between industrial structure and uncertainty in demand. Networks appear to be
more e¢ cient than vertically integrated structures when uncertainty in demand is substantial:
higher dispersion of buyers idiosyncratic demand shocks should be associated with network-like
industrial structures and more connected network structures.
Their result is consistent with several case studies. They cite the case of the US automobile
industry in 1920, when there was an increase in uncertainty because of competition from the
emerging used-car market and new independent manufacturers. After that, the big automakers
Ford and GMC moved away from vertical integration to exible arrangements with independent
suppliers (suggesting that disintegration is a response to underlying environmental uncertainty).
The same trend occurred in the lm industry in the 1940s, when the volatility in demand for
7For example, from 1980 to 1990, the major car manufacturers reduced their number of direct input suppliers
by more than 50 percent (Noteboom, 1999). This trend is more prominent in Japanese automobile and electronic
manufacturing. The number of direct suppliers to Japanese car manufacturers in 1988 was roughly one half of
what it was for American or European manufacturers, for similar volumes of production (Lamming, 1993). For
electronics and automobiles, Nishiguchi (1994) presents wide-ranging evidence from Japan on how rms rely more
and more on a subset of suppliers with whom they maintain close business ties. In the period from 1980 to 1990,
Fuji Electric Tokyo bought an additional 7 percent of its inputs from sub-contractors but it has reduced the
number of principal subcontractors by 38 percent. On average, electronic assembly contractors have 3.36 regular
costumer each of whom placed orders several times per year.
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Hollywood movies increased due to the advent of television, and rms moved away from vertical
integration to a more exible system with outsourcing for many aspects of lm production.
Summarizing, we want to focus on the following empirical facts documented in Hortaçsu
and Syverson (2009) and the main result presented in Kranton and Meinhart (2000):
 Fact 1) vertically integrated plants are larger on average and their size distribution is more
skewed
 Fact 2) When vertically integrating, big and e¢ cient downstream rms choose to acquire
upstream production units that are also big and e¢ cient
 Fact 3) The fraction of vertically integrated plants increases with the plants within-
industry size percentiles
 Fact 4) Besides being larger, vertically integrated plants have higher productivity
 Fact 5) When uncertainty in demand is substantial, rms are more likely to invest in
links with specic investments (rather than becoming vertically integrated or transact
standardized inputs in the market)
2 Environment
2.1 Key features of the model
We develop a long-run dynamic industry equilibrium model with heterogeneous rms interacting
as buyers and sellers of inputs. Final good manufacturers face idiosyncratic productivity shocks,
denoted by z (as in Hopenhayn 1992a). For production they need one unit of input from
suppliers, and with this unit they produce z units of nal good. Final good is homogeneous and
is sold in a competitive market. Each supplier is characterized by a productivity level ".
When a manufacturer enters the industry it has to obtain its inputs from the market for
inputs. In particular, they pay a price pu to buy one unit of input. It is assumed that this
price is determined by Bertrand competition among suppliers that all produce an homogeneous
input. Once pu is paid, the manufacturer learns the productivity ", of the supplier. Given the
(z; ") pair, the manufacturer, if it does not exit the industry, has three options: rst, it can
simply ignore " and use the standardized input. In this case the manufacturer simply produces
z units of nal good and pays xed cost of production (Cf ). It is assumed that productivity of
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standardized supplier is iid over time. Next period this manufacturer will start the period in
exactly the same situation, this is paying Cf , buying one unit of input and learning a new ".
Second, given (z; "), the manufacturer can invest (h) to become linked with the particular
supplier (we refer to links as L). In this case the manufacturer produces z and pays Cf   c(z; "),
where c(z; ") represents the cost advantage associated with getting a specialized input from
a particular supplier. A manufacturer pays for a specialized input pLu , which is determined
by Nash Bargaining. As long as the manufacturer and supplier remain linked, " remains the
same. Next period if z remains the same, the pair continues to be linked. If z changes, however,
manufacturer starts next period as a standardized manufacturer (i.e. it has all the same options)
with a particular " at hand. Finally, the manufacturer can pay h + PV I and become vertically
integrated with a particular supplier. In this case, it produces z and faces the cost Cf +
CV If   c(z; "). Here CV If represents the additional cost of being vertically integrated. Once a
manufacturer and a supplier become vertically integrated, they continue to do so until z changes
upon which manufacturer can reoptimize, although in order to continue vertically integrated the
manufacturer does not need to make any investment.
This environment gives rise to rich industry dynamics as manufacturer enter, exit and
decide how to obtain their inputs (i.e. to obtain them from the market, to establish links
or get vertically integrated). In this framework, once a manufacturer buys form a supplier it
cannot switch partner until next period, thus market frictions induce a hold-up problem (as in
Grossman and Hart 1986) to linked manufacturers.8 Moreover, uncertainty plays a key role.
Given that under vertical integration manufacturers face a relatively high cost of governance
(as in Grossman and Helpman 2002), reected by a higher xed cost of production, vertical
integration reduces exibility when facing a negative shock (compared to links and the use of
standardized inputs).
Therefore, there is a clear trade-o¤ between links and vertical integration. On the one
hand, a linked manufacturer has lower xed costs but, faces higher endogenous variable costs
(determined by the input price negotiation, as it will be explained later on). On the other
hand, becoming vertically integrated requires a bigger investment, and imply higher xed costs,
but lower variable costs to manufacturers. From now on, we use the terms manufacturer and
downstream rms, as well as suppliers and upstream rms, interchangeably (notice subscripts
8After investments have been made, the supplier can renegotiate the input price, increasing the incentives of
the manufacturer to buy standardized inputs or become vertically integrated.
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and superscripts d and u, for downstream and upstream rms, respectively).
2.2 Incumbent rms problem
We assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty. Thus, by a law of large numbers, all
aggregate quantities and prices are deterministic over time, although at the rm level, from the
point of view of a manufacturer, each rm still faces idiosyncratic uncertainty. We will focus on
steady-state stationary equilibrium in which all aggregate variables are constant over time.
2.2.1 Manufacturers
By using one unit of input, a manufacturer produces a quantity z of homogeneous nal
goods, where z indicates the manufacturers managerial ability, and sell the production in a
competitive market at a price p. Moreover, we assume that z is independent across rms and
follows a Markov process F (z0=z) with density function f(z0=z). In addition, we assume that F
is strictly decreasing in z and z 2 Z, where Z = fz1; z2; ::::; zng and zi+1 > zi for all i. In other
words, the higher is the managerial ability of a manufacturer today, the more likely it will be
higher tomorrow 9
Standardized manufacturer
A standardized manufacturer, at the beginning of every period, before the current produc-
tivity shock is realized, has to pay a xed cost of production, Cf . In addition, it pays an up-front
a price, pu, for the standardized input to a randomly matched standardized supplier. Figure 2
9As in Hopenhayn (1992a), this assumption implies that expected discounted prots are an increasing function
of rms current productivity shock.
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represents the decisions and timing.
Figure 2: Timing for a standardized manufacturer.
Once Cf and pu are paid, the idiosyncratic productivity shock, z, is realized and the man-
ufacturer learns the quality of the specialized input the supplier can produce. We assume that
the suppliers type, ", has density function gu("). As explained before, " is a match-specic
productivity, which can also be interpreted as the managerial ability of the supplier to design
and produce a new good and input, and to synchronize production process, together with the
matched manufacturer.
Once z and " are known, the manufacturer decides whether to stay or exit the industry
for the next period, and, if it stays in the industry, it must decide whether to use standardized
inputs or specialized inputs. In addition, in each situation, it has also to decide whether to
produce or not. Thus, if the productivity is very low, in order to avoid paying the xed costs
and the cost of standardized input, the manufacturers may decide to exit the industry for next
period. Therefore, as in standard industry dynamics models, there is endogenous exit, hence,
in steady state, there is ongoing entry and exit of manufacturers. If the manufacturer stays in
the industry, it has to decide whether to use standardized inputs or switch to using specialized
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inputs. If it uses standardized inputs, next period it will get a new ".
In order to use specialized inputs the standardized manufacturer has two alternatives, either
to become linked with the supplier or become vertically integrated with it (acquire suppliers
plant). In both cases, the manufacturer must make specic investments, h (this cost can be
thought of as cots in designing a suitable input for the pair z and " -which is specic to the
match- i.e. training costs, costs of providing equipment, know-how, etc.). This investment has
two e¤ects, to keep the same suppliers type ", and to reduce the variable costs to c(z; "), where
z and " are complements.10 ;11
If the manufacturer becomes linked with the supplier, we assume that the reduction in
variable costs lasts until z changes, and in that case, in order to take advantage of specialized
inputs the manufacturer has to invest again h designing a suitable input for the new pair (z; ").
Moreover, once the specic investment is sunk, the price for the specialized input, pLu (z; "; p),
is negotiated (determined by Nash Bargaining Solution, NBS). Hence specic investments are
subject to hold-up problem which increases the incentives to buy standardized inputs or become
vertically integrated, as explained before.12 Notice that a linked manufacturer rm has same
xed costs (Cf ) and lower variable costs (pLu (z; "; p)  c(z; ")) relative to a standardized rm. If
the manufacturer decides to become vertically integrated, in addition to the specic investment,
h, it has to pay an acquisition price PV I to the supplier (as it will become clear later PV I
will correspond to the market value of the supplier). By becoming vertically integrated the
manufacturer avoids the hold-up problem.
As in Grossman and Helpman (2002), due to the lack of complete specialization and the
extra governance costs associated to managing di¤erent plants, we assume that VI increases
manufacturers xed production costs. This means that a vertically integrated manufacturer
10This will be a result of the calibration. We will assume a exible variable cost function that allows for
complementarities between manufacturer and supplier types and, as it will be shown in the following sections, when
we calibrate our model so that the industry stationary steady-state equilibrium matches selected characteristics
of the U.S. manufacturing sector, complementarities will appear.
11The assumptions made on the variable cost function generates a rm behavior which, as it will be shown
later on, is in line with new empirical evidence. In particular, Kuglery and Verhoogen (2011), using data from
the Colombian manufacturing census, documents that larger plants charge more for their outputs and pay more
for their material inputs, and proposes a model of endogenous input and output quality choices by heterogeneous
rms to explain the observed patterns.
12The hold-up problem is induced by the opportunistic behavior of the supplier. After matching with a given
supplier, once the manufacturer has sunk the investment h; there is a bilateral monopoly situation and the supplier
seeks to renegotiate the agreement increasing the input price from pu to pLu . Thus the manufacturer is not the full
residual claimant of the additional returns the investment generates. Anticipating this, the buyer has an incentive
to take the supplier into the rm (becoming VI).
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has to pay, in addition to the same xed cost as the standardized manufacturer, Cf , and the
xed cost of the acquired supplier, Cuf , a managerial xed cost,  (which is assumed to be
positive, but it will be a result of the calibration). Furthermore, notice that uncertainty plays
a key role: VI increases rms xed costs to Cf + Cuf +  reducing its exibility when facing a
negative shock (when compared to links and market transactions).
When becoming vertically integrated we assume that, in contrast with the link case, the cost
advantage c(z; "), for di¤erent levels of z, is permanent. We assume that, by paying a higher
xed cost of production every period, a vertically integrated rm redesigns the input every
time z changes without any additional cost. Therefore, the state variables for a standardized
manufacturer is its idiosyncratic productivity, z, the quality of its supplier, ", and prices p and
pu. Thus, assuming stationarity (distributions, and thus also prices, do not change over time),
the value function for the standardized manufacturer rm is:
V S(z; "; p; pu) = max
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
max
as(z;p;pu)
pas()z   pu   Cf + max
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0|{z}
Exit
;
X
z0
X
"0
V S(z0; "0; p; pu)f(z0jz)gu("0)| {z }
Standardized (new draw of supplier)
9>>>>>=>>>>>;| {z }
Standardized
;
max
aL(z;";p);pLu (z;";p;pu)
aL()[pz   (pLu (z; "; p)  pu) + c(z; ")]  pu   Cf   h
+ 

V L(z; "; p; pLu )f(z
0 = zjz) +P
z0
V S(z0; "; p; pu)f(z0 6= zjz)

;| {z }
Link
max
aV I(z;";p)
aV I()[pz + c(z; ")]  pu   CV If|{z}
Cuf+
  Cf   (PV I + h) + 
X
z0
V V I(z0; "; p)f(z0jz)
| {z }
Vertical Integration
;
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
;
(1)
where as(z; p; pu), aL(z; p; pu) and aV I(z; p) are the static production decision rules, and CV If is
the additional xed cost of production of a vertically integrated manufacturer, CV If = C
u
f + .
By standard dynamic programming arguments (e.g., see Stokey and Lucas (1989)), one can show
that there is a unique value function satisfying the Bellman equation. The same applies to the
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following value functions.
The rst term of this value function corresponds to the case where the manufacturer remains
using standardized inputs in current production and, if it does not exit, for the next period as it
is presented in the continuation value. The second term corresponds to the situation in which the
manufacturer uses specialized inputs by linking with the supplier. Therefore, the manufacturer
decides whether to produce or not and negotiates the input price, pLu (z; "; p), with the supplier.
As long as z remains the same for the next period, the pair continues to be linked (as it can be
seen in the rst term in the continuation value). If z changes, however, manufacturer starts next
period as a standardized manufacturer with the same previous " at hand (look at the second
term in the continuation value). The third term represents the value of becoming vertically
integrated with the supplier. Thus, the manufacturer decides whether to produce or not and it
will start the next period as a vertically integrated rm, that is, with the same cost advantage
as a rm that continues linked, but with higher xed costs of production.
Moreover, notice that by becoming a linked rm, the manufacturer faces lower xed costs
(just Cf ) and higher variable costs (pLu (z; "; p)   c(z; ")) relative to becoming a vertically in-
tegrated rm. Besides, by becoming vertically integrated, the manufacturer faces higher xed
costs (Cf + CV If ) and lower variable costs (it does not pay pu and receives the cost advantage
c(z; ")) relative to a standardized manufacturer; and has higher xed costs (Cf+CV If ) and lower
variable costs (doesnt pay pLu (z; "; p)) relative to a linked rm. Thus, there is a clear trade-o¤
of linking versus becoming vertically integrated. We will discuss later on how the properties
of the stochastic process (i.e. persistence) governing the uncertainty at rm level also plays a
role in these trade-o¤s, and thus determine di¤erences in the vertical structure of rms across
industries.
Linked manufacturer
At the beginning of every period, a manufacturer linked with a supplier of type " pays a xed
cost of production Cf , and productivity z is realized. If the new productivity shock z is equal
to the previous shock, then the link continues and rms trade inputs at the same negotiated
input price pLu (z; "; p) from the previous period and production takes place. Otherwise, if the
realization of the new shock z is di¤erent from the previous one, the link is broken and the
manufacturer has to decide again whether to invest in a link or not. Moreover, if the link
is broken, it becomes again a standardized manufacturer, hence it has the same continuation
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options as a standardized rm, with the only di¤erence that it is matched with the same supplier
as in the previous period.
The value function of a linked manufacturer when z has not changed is given by
V L(z; "; p; pLu ) = pz   pLu (z; "; p) + c(z; )  Cf


V L(z; "; p; pLu )f(z
0 = zjz) +P
z0
V S(z0; "; p; pu)f(z0 6= zjz)

;
(2)
which, after some simple operations, becomes
V L(z; "; p; pLu ) =
pz pLu (z;";p)+c(z;") Cf
1 f(z0=zjz) +
(1 f(z0=zjz))
1 f(z0=zjz)
P
z0
V S(z0; "; p; pu)f(z0 6= zjz): (3)
Vertically integrated manufacturer
A manufacturer that is vertically integrated with a supplier of type " pays xed costs of
production Cf and CV If ; productivity z is realized (while " remains the same). Therefore, it
decides current production, aV I 2 f0; 1g, and the state for the next period (Figure 3). It has
the same continuation options as for the standardized rm (invest in L, get a new supplier, exit
the industry), but in order to continue vertically integrated with same supplier it has to make
no additional investment. In the case of investing in a link (disintegrate but remain matched
with same supplier) the manufacturer produces today as a vertically integrated rm and, since
next period on, it has to pay a negotiated input price pLu (z; "; p).
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Figure 3: Timing for a vertically integrated manufacturer.
According to the previous timing, the value function for a vertically integrated manufacturer
looks like in Equation 4. A manufacturer with productivity z that enters the current period
being vertically integrated with a supplier of type " , after paying the xed costs, has to decide
whether to produce or not so as to maximize the per period prot. Next, it has to decides
in which state it enters the next period, this is either continue vertically integrated (with the
second continuation value), without making any additional investment, or disintegrate. In case
it decides to disintegrate, it still has the option to continue producing with the same supplier by
becoming linked with it after investing h (with the rst continuation value). Finally, it can also
become a standardized manufacturer starting the next period with a new ", as it is indicated
by the third continuation value, or exit the industry.
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V V I(z; "; p) = max
aV I(z;";p);x
0
V I(z;";p)
aV I(z; "; p)[pz + c(z; ")]  CV If   Cf
 hIV I(x0V I(z; "; p) = L)
+
8>>>><>>>>:
"
V L(z; "; p; pLu )f(z
0 = zjz) +
X
z0
V S(z0; "; p; pu)f(z0 6= zjz)
#
| {z }
Link
+IV I(x0V I(z; "; p) = V I)
X
z0
V V I(z0; "; p)f(z0jz)| {z }
Vertical Integration
+IV I(x0V I(z; "; p) = S)
X
z0
X
"0
V S(z0; "0; p; pu)f(z0jz)gu("0)| {z }
Standardized (new draw)
+IV I(x0V I(z; "; p) = Exit)0| {z }
Exit
9=; ;
(4)
where x0V I() 2 fV I; L; S;Exitg is the decision rule, that is the state chosen for the next period,
and IV I() are indicator functions given x0V I().
2.2.2 Suppliers
Standardized supplier
Standardized suppliers produce one unit of an homogeneous input and compete in prices.
They have zero marginal cost and pay a xed cost, Cuf ; every period. Once they match with a
manufacturer, the quality " of the specialized input they are able to produce is realized. In case
they remain as standardized input supplier the quality of the match, ", is i.i.d. over time and
across suppliers. The value function of a standardized supplier is
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WS(z; "; p; pu) = pu   Cuf
+
8>>>><>>>>:I
S(x0S() = L)
"
WL(z; "; p; pLu )f(z
0 = zjz) +
X
z0
WS(z; "; p; pu)f(z
0 6= zjz)
#
| {z }
manufacturer decides to become linked
+IS(x0S(z; "; p; pu) = V I)PV I(z; ")| {z }
manufacturer decides to become VI
+
+
 
1  IS(x0S() = V I)  IS(x0S() = L)
X
"0
X
z0
WS(z0; "0; p; pu)Jd(z0)gu("0)| {z }
manufacturer decides to be use standardized inputs
9>>>>=>>>>; ;
(5)
where x0S() 2 fV I; L; S;Exitg is the decision rule of the standardized manufacturer that is
matched with this supplier, and IS() are the corresponding indicator functions given x0S().
The function Jd(z0) is an equilibrium object that represents the density of manufacturers, for
each particular productivity level z, that will be looking for a standardized supplier in the next
period. For each value of z the density Jd(z0) is determined by the process of entry, exit,
investment in links and vertical integration.
Specialized supplier
A specialized (linked) supplier produce one unit of the input using the same technology as a
standardized supplier. It o¤ers an input of heterogeneous quality which is permanent over time
(as explained before, conditional on producing with the same manufacturer every period). In
addition it negotiates the input price in a bilateral monopoly situation with the manufacturer,
due to the market frictions (once the manufacturer is matched with a supplier it cannot switch
partner until next period).
The value function of a linked supplier is
WL(z; "; p; pLu ) = p
L
u (z; "; p) Cuf+
(
WL(z; "; p; pLu )f(z
0 = zjz) +
X
z0
WS(z0; "; p; pu)f(z0 6= zjz)
)
;
(6)
which, after some simple operations, becomes
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WL(z; "; p; pu) =
pLu (z; "; p)  Cuf
1  f(z0 = zjz) +
(1  f(z0 = zjz))
1  f(z0 = zjz)
X
z0
WS(z0; "; p; pu)f(z0 6= zjz): (7)
We assume that, if a linked manufacturer breaks the link with a supplier, then the supplier
returns to the standardized inputs market, gets matched with another standardized manufac-
turer, and gets a new draw of " from gu("). In addition, if a supplier becomes vertically integrated
it gets PV I and disappears. Furthermore, if the manufacturer disintegrates, then the supplier
appears again as a standardized supplier.
2.2.3 Equilibrium prices
Price for the specialized input and acquisition price
Given all the previous value functions, we can now dene the prices for the specialized
inputs and the acquisition price for a supplier rm that a manufacturer pays when vertically
integrating. The rst one is dened, according to Nash Bargaining, as follows:
pLu (z; "; p) = argmaxpLu

pz pLu ()+c() Cf
1 f(z0=zjz) +
(1 f(z0=zjz))
1 f(z0=zjz)
P
z0
V S(z0; "; p; pu)f(z0 6= zjz)
 
0BBBBBBBBB@
pz   pu   Cf + max
8>>>><>>>>: 0|{z}Exit ;
X
z0
X
"0
V S(z0; "0; p; pu)f(z0jz)gu("0)| {z }
Standardized Manufacturer
9>>>>=>>>>;| {z }
Manufacturer outside option
1CCCCCCCCCA
37777777775


pLu () Cuf
1 f(z0=zjz) +
(1 f(z0=zjz))
1 f(z0=zjz)
P
z0
WS(z0; "; p; pu)f(z0 6= zjz)
 
0BBBBBBBBBB@
pu   Cuf + 
X
"0
X
z0
WS(z0; "0; p; pu)Jd(z0)gu("0)| {z }
Standardized Supplier| {z }
Supplier outside option
1CCCCCCCCCCA
377777777775
1 
;
(8)
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where  is the bargaining power of the manufacturer. Thus solving for the bargained specialized
input price we get:
pLu (z; "; p) = (1  f(z0 = zjz))(1  )

pz+c() Cf
1 f(z0=zjz) +
(1 f(z0=zjz))
1 f(z0=zjz)
P
z0
V S()f(z0 6= zjz)
 

pz   pu   Cf + max

0;
P
z0
P
"0
V S(z0; "0; p; pu)f(z0jz)gu("0)

 

 Cuf
1 f(z0=zjz) +
(1 f(z0=zjz))
1 f(z0=zjz)
P
z0
WS(z0; "; p; pu)f(z0 6= zjz)
 

pu   Cuf + 
P
"0
P
z0
WS(z0; "0; p; pu)Jd(z0)gu("0)

:
(9)
Thus, the specialized input price depends only on the value functions of the standardized
manufacturer and supplier. Moreover, I assume that a standardized manufacturer which opti-
mally chooses to become vertically integrated makes a take-it-of-leave-it o¤er to the supplier and
pays to him a price PV I that is the present discounted value of being a standardized supplier.
This is, we assume that the market value of the supplier is PV I = Ez0;"0WS(z0; "0; p; pu).
2.2.4 Free Entry Condition
There is free entry of manufacturers who are ex-ante identical. We assume that manufacturer
rms that enter the industry make no specic investment. This means that entrants cannot
enter the industry being vertically integrated or linked rms, they just enter as standardized
manufacturers.
They must pay a sunk downstream entry cost, Cde  0, the xed cost of production, Cf  0
and the buy one unit of the standardized input paying pu After that, they draw z from gd(z)
and then match randomly with a supplier according to gu("). For entrants that survive, for
next period, their productivity shocks, z, evolve according to F (z0=z). Thus, the value of the
expected future discounted prots of a new downstream rm is
V de (p; pu) =
X
"
X
z
V S(z; "; p; pu)g
d(z)gu("): (10)
In the input industry there is also free entry. Entrants are ex-ante homogeneous producers
and enter the input industry as standardized suppliers. They rst have to pay a sunk upstream
entry cost, Cue  0; and xed cost, Cuf  0. After doing so, they earn pu and matches randomly
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with a manufacturer, according to Jd(z), and their type " is revealed according to gu("). Thus,
the value at entry for an upstream rm is
W ue (pu; p) =
X
"
X
z
WS(z; "; p; pu)J
d(z)gu("): (11)
2.3 Characterization of Equilibrium
Before dening the stationary equilibrium in this model we rst make some additional assump-
tions and state new denitions. As mentioned before, the analysis in this section considers the
existence of complementarity between manufacturer and suppliers types but, assumption that
will be conrmed in the calibration. Thus, let us assume that the variable cost function c(z; ")
satises increasing di¤erences.13 In other words, manufacturers of di¤erent types can produce
more e¢ ciently with a supplier of high "-type, but the cost advantage is greater for producers
of high z-types. Therefore, assuming a given functional form for c(z; ") we can plot c(z; ")+Cf
(solid grey curves in Figure 4) which is weakly decreasing in ", together with the revenue func-
tion, pz; (solid black curve in Figure 4) for a standardized manufacturer. The distance between
the latter and pu + Cf is the per period prot of a standardized manufacturer.
The upper curve c(z; ") + Cf (the straight line) in in Figure 4 represents the case of the
least e¢ cient manufacturer (denoted by z) . We can see that when it is matched with the most
e¢ cient supplier (denoted by ") it does not improve in costs. In contrast, when the most e¢ cient
manufacturer (denoted by z) is matched with the most e¢ cient supplier (denoted by ") there is
13A manufacturer of type z that is matched with a supplier of type " has cost advantage c(z; ") that satises
the following property:
c(zi; "j)  c(zi; "j 1) > c(zi 1; "j)  c(zi 1; "j 1) 8i; j = 1; ::; n
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a big decline in total costs (lower curve).
Figure 4: Costs, revenues and prots of a neither VI nor linked rm.
Furthermore, for a standardized manufacturer of type zi matched with a supplier of type
"j , the static gain from using specialized inputs (net of costs corresponding to the cases of VI or
link) is the di¤erence between the distances A and B. Clearly, as it can be seen in the picture,
the static gain from using specialized inputs is increasing in z and ": We will use this property
of the prot functions, together with the characteristics assumed on F , to state that the value
of investing in the use of specialized inputs is increasing in z and ".
To gain more intuition about how the model works lets show which vertical structure a
manufacturer chooses for next period given the current productivity. In the following proposition
we focus on a standardized manufacturer rm, but the same reasoning should be followed for
the case of a vertically integrated rm and a linked one:
Proposition 1 There exist two sets of pairs (z; ") that dene sets of thresholds S  Z  E
and eS  Z  E for a a standardized manufacturer rm such that:
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i) If (z; ") =2 UCS(S), the rm exits the industry (where UCS(S) is upper contour set of
S)
ii) If (z; ") 2 UCS(eS), the rm stays in the industry and decides to be vertically integrated
or set up links
iii) If (z; ") =2 UCS(eS) and (z; ") 2 UCS(S), the rm stays in the industry being a standard-
ized manufacturer rm.
Proof Lets rst dene z as the minimum productivity level at which a standardized man-
ufacturer, before observing the current supplier type " it is matched with, decides to stay in the
industry and get a new draw of supplier for next period. Lets compare the two continuations
values in the rst term of equation (1). Given that F is decreasing in z and c(z; ") is increasing
in z, the continuation value of getting a new draw of ", Ez0;"0

V S(z0; "0; p; pu)=z

, is monotone
increasing in z. Therefore, as V S() is continuous in z, by the intermediate value theorem there
exists a thresholds z and it is singled valued, and dened as in Hopenhayn (1992):
z = inf
(
z 2 Z :
X
z0
X
"0
V S(z0; "0; p; pu)f(z0jz)gu("0)  0
)
:
Now lets focus on nding eS and postpone S for a moment. For that we are looking for the
set of minimum productivity levels for z and " at which the current and expected continuation
value of using specialized goods (becoming vertically integrated or linked) is greater than or
equal to being a standardized manufacturer. We know that for pairs of (z; ") formed by low
values of z and ", given the assumptions on costs and sunk specic investment, the rm does not
decide to become vertically integrated or set up links. Furthermore, in order to have available the
continuation values corresponding to VI or L the rm has to invest h + PV I or h, respectively.
This means that the corresponding expected future discounted prots plus present revenues
must be high enough to recover the costs h+PV I or h. But, given that the continuation values
of becoming vertically integrated or linked are monotone increasing in z and ", and as V V I()
and V L() are continuous in z and ", for each value of z; by the intermediate value theorem,
there exists a level for " (a threshold), which is singled valued, at which the standardized
manufacturer decides to become vertically integrated or linked. This reasoning allows us to
dene a correspondence eS(z) that maps values of z into values for "; eS(z) : Z ! eE, where eE is
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a subset of E. Thus eS(z) is formally dened as
eS(z) 
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
" 2 eE : given z;
0BBBBBBBBBBBBB@
max
*
V L(z; "; p; pLu )| {z }
Value of becoming Linked today
  h; V V I(z; "; p)| {z }
Value of becoming VI today
  h+ PV I
+
 pas(z; p; pu)z   pu   Cf + max
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0|{z}
Exit
;
X
z0
X
"0
V S(z0; "0; p; pu)f(z0jz)gu("0)| {z }
Standardized (new draw of supplier)
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCA
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
:
Then, the set eS is dened as
eS  ((z; #) 2 Z  eE : i) #  inf eS(z) ; and
ii) eS(z) 6= ?
)
:
Thus, the denition for the UCS(eS) is as follows
UCS(eS)  (z; eS(z) 2 Z  eE : ( i) eS(z) dened as before; and
ii) eS(z) 6= ?
)
:
In words, all the values (z; ") 2 UCS(eS) dene a subset of Z E at which the downstream
rm decides to be vertically integrated or have links with the supplier for the following period.
This means that the productivity of the match is high enough so that the manufacturer wants
to keep the same supplier and it covers all the corresponding investment costs.
Now we can use the previous dened objects (thresholds z and eS) to dene S.
S 
(
(z; ") 2 Z  E :
(
z = z; 8" if z \ eS1 = ?
(z; ") 2 (z;b") [ (ez;e") if z \ eS1 6= ?
)
; (12)
where b" = f" : " = inf(eS(z))g; ez = fz : z  zg, e" = f" : " 2 eS(ez)g and eS1 is the rst element
of all the pairs dened by eS1.
Basically the next proposition states that if a standardized manufacturer rm with a given
productivity pair (z; ") decides to become vertically integrated or linked, then any rm with
higher e¢ ciency levels (z; ") will also become vertically integrated or linked.
Proposition 2 Given (ez;e") 2 eS; 8z  ez, "  e" : UCS(z; ")  UCS(ez;e"):
Proof Take (zn; eS(zn)) 2 eS. As the maximum continuation value for the rm is Ez0 [V V I()]
or Ez0 [V L()], and given that c(z; ") is increasing in ", both of these continuation values are
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increasing in ". Then 8" > eS(zn) we have that (zn; ") 2 UCS(zn; eS(zn)). Furthermore,
UCS(zn; ")  UCS(zn; eS(zn)). By the same argument, if 9(zn j ; eS(zn j)) 2 eS ) 8" > eS(zn j)
we have that (zn j ; ") 2 UCS(zn j ; eS(zn j)) and UCS(zn j ; ")  UCS(zn j ; eS(zn j)) 8j =
1; ::; n   1: Moreover, as Ez0 [V V I()] and Ez0 [V L()] are also increasing in z; given (zi; "h) 2
UCS(eS) ) 8(z; ") s.t. z  zi; "  "h we have that UCS(z; ")  UCS(zi; "h) for i; h = 1; ::; n:
Intuitively the previous two propositions are a characterization of the decision rules for
a standardized manufacturer. They state that, under the assumptions made on costs, these
decision rules look like presented in Figure 5. In the horizontal axis we have the productivity
of the manufacturer and in the vertical axis the productivity of the supplier. The gure shows
the regions of (z; ) under which a standardized manufacturer decides to exit the industry, to
become vertically integrated, to set up link or to continue standardized for next period.
In panel A we have the case in which z \ eS = ? in our expression (12), and thus there
is only one relevant threshold (z) that manufacturers consider to exit the industry. This is, a
manufacturer with a productivity shock bellow z decides to exit the industry independently to
which suppliers type it is matched with. If its productivity level z is above that threshold, the
rm decides to remain active in the industry, and if it is matched with an e¢ cient supplier it
decides to become vertically integrated or linked.
In panel B we have the case in which z \ eS 6= ? in our expression (12), and thus there is
a set of relevant thresholds (S) that manufacturers consider to exit the industry. Furthermore,
in contrast with Panel A, a manufacturer with a productivity shock bellow z can survive if it is
matched with an e¢ cient supplier. The equilibrium shape of the set of relevant thresholds will
depend on the parametrization of the model. We will focus on that in the calibration section.
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Figure 5: Decision rule for a (z; ")-standardized manufacturer for next period.
Panel A Panel B
2.4 Stationary Equilibrium
Because there is a continuum of rms that are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, there is a cross
sectional distribution of rms over the states (z; ") and over di¤erent vertical structures. We call
S the stationary distribution of downstream standardized rms, and V I ,L,S and L the
stationary distribution of vertically integrated manufacturers, linked manufacturers, standard-
ized suppliers and specialized suppliers, respectively. Let0s dene D(p) as the aggregate demand,
that is continuous and strictly decreasing. Then, the stationary equilibrium is standard:
A stationary equilibrium in this model is a list of value functions for manufacturers and sup-
pliers (V S(z; "; p; pu); V L(z; "; p; pu); V V I(z; "; p); WS(z; "; p; pu); WL(z; "; p; pu); V de (p); W
u
e (pu)),
policy functions (aS(z; "; p; pu), x0S(z; "; p; pu); aL(z; "; p; pu); aV I(z; "; p); x
0
V I(z; "; p)), prices p
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and pu and price functions pLu (z; "; p) and PV I(z; "), invariant measures for downstream stan-
dardized rms S , vertically integrated rms V I and linked rms L and invariant measures
for upstream standardized rms S and upstream linked rms L, an invariant density Jd(z), a
mass of downstream and upstream entrants md and mu, and sets of thresholds S and eS, given
the aggregate demand function for nal goods Dd(p) such that:
i) Input prices pLu (z; "; p) and acquisition prices pV I(z; ") are given by NBS
ii) Given p; pu; pLu (z; "; p; pu) and PV I(z; "), policy functions aS(z; "; p; pu), aV I(z; "; p) and
aL(z; "; p; pu) solve the static input decisions
iii) Given p; pu; pLu (z; "; p; pu) and PV I(z; "), policy functions x
0
S(z; "; p; pu) and x
0
V I(z; "; p)
solve the dynamic decisions of rms
iv) Free entry conditions are satised for manufacturers
Cde = V
d
e (p; pu) =
X
"
X
z
V S(z; "; p; pu)g
d(z)gu("); (13)
and for suppliers
Cue =W
u
e (pu; p) =
X
"
X
z
WS(z; "; p; pu)J
d(z)gu("): (14)
v) Market clearing conditions are satised in the market for nal goods Dd(p) = Sd(p) and
in the market for standardized inputs Du(pu) = Su(pu) where
Sd(p) =
P
z
P
"
zS(z; ") +
P
z
P
"
zaV I(z; "; p)
V I(z; ")
+
P
z
P
"
zaL(z; "; p; p
L
u )
L(z; "):
(15)
vi) Laws of motion of states are consistent with individual decisions (stationary measures
S ,V I ,L,S and L are xed points). As mentioned before the heterogeneity of a
market rm is described by S(B) measure on (S;B); where S = Z  E and Bs = all
possible subsets of S, and BBs: Then we have the following xed point of the form
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S = T (S ;md):
S(B) =
snX
z
snX
"
Pr
  
z0; "0

Bjz; "| {z }
Element of the Markov chain
IS(x0S(z; "; p; pu) = S)| {z }
Indicator function from policy functions
S(z; ")
| {z }
Incumbent who survive
+
snX
z
snX
"
Pr
  
z0; "0

Bjz; " IV I(x0V I(z; "; p) = S)V I(z; ")| {z }
Vertically Integrated Incumbent who survive
+
snX
z
snX
"
Pr
  
z0; "0

Bjz; " IL(x0L(z; "; p; pLu ) = S)L(z; ")| {z }
Linked Incumbent who survive
8BBs:
snX
z
snX
"
Pr
  
z0; "0

Bjz; "| {z }
Element of the Markov chain
IS(x0S(z; "; p; pu) = S)| {z }
Indicator function from policy functions
mdgd(z)gu("))
| {z }
Entrants
(16)
In a similar way, the heterogeneity of incumbent downstream rms that are vertically
integrated and linked is described by V I(B) measure on (S;B) and L(B) measure on
(S;B): Then we have V I = T V I(V I) and L = TL(L):
V I(B) =
snP
z
snP
"
Pr ((z0; "0) Bjz; ") IS(x0S(z; "; p; pu) = V I)ND(z; ")
+
snP
z
snP
"
Pr ((z0; "0) Bjz; ") IV I(x0V I(z; "; p) = V I)V I(z; ")
+
snP
z
snP
"
Pr ((z0; "0) Bjz; ") IL(x0L(z; "; p; pLu ) = V I)L(z; ") 8BBs:
(17)
And nally, we have the following xed point for the measures of linked rms
L(B) =
snP
z
snP
"
Pr ((z0; "0) Bjz; ") IS(x0S(z; "; p; pu) = L)ND(z; ")
+
snP
z
snP
"
Pr ((z0; "0) Bjz; ") IV I(x0V I(z; "; p) = L)V I(z; ")
+
snP
z
snP
"
Pr ((z0; "0) Bjz; ") IL(x0L(z; "; p; pLu ) = L)L(z; ") 8BBs:
(18)
vii) The mass of suppliers, mu, equal the mass of standardized and linked manufacturers
mu =
X
z
X
"
S(z; ") +
X
z
X
"
L(z; ")
In the appendix, it is explained the algorithm used to compute the equilibrium.
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3 Quantitative Analysis
3.1 Calibration-Preliminary Results
To solve the model numerically, we need to specify functional forms for the demand and rms
technology and assign parameter values. Basically, we calibrate our model so that the industry
stationary equilibrium matches selected characteristics of the U.S. manufacturing sector taken
from the U.S. Census Bureau and from Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007 and 2009). Table 2
summarizes the values for the parameters set a priori.
Table 2: Parameters set a priori
Parameters Denition Value
 Bargaining power of the buyer 0:5 assumed
 Discount factor 0:96 assumed
B Inverse of demand elasticity 1:164 Nicholson (1989)
 Autoregressive parameter 0:93 Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)
Manufacturers and suppliers are assumed to have the same bargaining power,  = 1=2. In
addition, we set a discount factor value  = 0:96 consistent with a 4% interest rate. We assume
a constant elasticity of demand, p = A
Y B
, where Y is the aggregate production, A is a scaling
factor and B is the inverse demand elasticity which we take equal to 1:164.14 The parameter A
is normalized to one (it has no impact on the relevant endogenous variables).15
We assume that shocks z has lognormal distribution and follows an AR(1) process,
ln zt =  +  ln zt 1 + t; with t  N(0; 2);
where t is the iid shock, and the parameter  is a measure of persistence of the idiosyncratic
productivity process. Changes in the persistence of the shocks will have an impact on how a rm
decides its vertical structure given the properties of the costs. Therefore, if persistence is very
high, then, loosely speaking, an e¢ cient rm expects that high shocks today will be around for
a long time. Conversely, if shocks are not very persistent, then the manufacturer will take into
account the possibility of incurring high losses (due to high xed costs) or not recovering the
14We take the average of the elasticity values published in Nicholson (1989): Food 0.21, Medical Services 0.20,
Automobiles 1.20, Housing (Rental) 0.18, Housing (Owner-Occupied) 1.2, Gasoline 0.54, Electricity 1.14, Giving
to Charity 1.29, Beer 1.13, Marijuana 1.5.
15Sensitivity analysis with respect to A;B;  and other parameters was performed and it is presented later on.
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irreversible investment (h+PV I), because there is a strong possibility that they will be incurred
relatively soon.
A 25-points grid was assumed for both discretized shocks z and ", where we assume Z = E
to simplify.16 The transition matrix for z was obtained by Tauchens method which approxi-
mates the previous AR(1) process for the idiosyncratic shocks. The estimation of its persistence
parameter  was taken from Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), assuming that rms in both mod-
els are hit by the same stochastic idiosyncratic productivity process17. We took the invariant
distribution of the Markov chain matrix for z as the initial distribution gd(z) and as gu(").
With respect to the function c(z; ") we assume a function as follows
c(zi; "j) = T1

zi   z1
zn   z1
 "j   "1
"n   "1
1 
+ T2IfV I;Linkg;
which is increasing in zi and "j , with  2 [0; 1]. The parameter T1 is the maximum gain
from searching a supplier, for the most e¢ cient manufacturer (being zn and matched with an
"n supplier reduces the nonsunk cost T1); and T2 is the gain from investment (by investing
h+PV I in becoming vertically integrated, or h in becoming linked, the manufacturer reduce the
nonsunk cost in this amount T2, independently on the type of the supplier it is matched with).
The parameter  indicates how important is the manufacturers type in the e¤ect of the cost
reducing investment. Notice that c(z; ") is exible, in the sense that it allows for the absence of
increasing di¤erences.
Table 3 presents the value for the calibrated parameters with the corresponding moments
the model tries to match. Figure 6 shows the shape of the function c(zi; j) for the parameter
values presented above:
16The number of grid points was selected so as to have a smooth enough behavior of rmsdecisions.
17One can also assume that, under a Leontie¤ production function, employment follows the same stochastic
process as revenues.
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Table 3: Calibrated Parameters and moments to t.
Denition Target Denition

2
T1
T2
Autoregressive intercept
Standard deviation of .
Gain from searching for high "
Cost reduction
0
0.15
75
0
9=;
revenue
distrib.
of rms
Cf Fixed cost 0.40 10%
8>><>>:
Annual exit rate
(Bartelsman,
Haltiwanger
and Scarpetta 2000)

Extra managerial xed cost of
a vertically integrated rm
3.15 8%  9%

%VI rms (Hortaçsu
and Syverson 2009)
h Investment cost of L 1.3 25%

% L rms
(Uzzi 1996)

Relative weight of z in cost
reduction
0.47 7%
8>><>>:
times the median-sized
manufacturing plant
is VI (Hortaçsu and
Syverson, 2009)
Cde Sunk cost of entry 3.01 V
e(1) Entry value given p = 1
Figure 6: Cost function c(z; )
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The value of the intercept, , and the variance of the error term, 2, of the AR(1) stochastic
process for z, as well as T1 and T2 are chosen so as to t the size (revenue) distribution of rms of
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the US manufacturing sector. Revenue values in the model are expressed in millions of dollars.
In particular, we use the U.S. Census Bureau tabulated data prepared by the Small Business
Administration (SBA) for year 2002.
Table 4 that indicates a mean revenues for all rms of 11,434 millions of dollars. In addition,
the share of rms in the rst interval of revenues (0-0.99) of 51.45%, and the shares of rms
with revenues between (1-4.99), (5-9.99) and (10-49.99) are 22.7%, 5.7% and 7.5%, respectively.
Finally, the share of the biggest rms that have revenues above 50 millions is 12.6%. Hence
we choose , 2, T2 and T2 in order to minimize the Euclidean distance between the data and
model densities of rms in each scale interval so as to generate a revenue distribution that is in
line with Table 4.
Table 4: Size (revenue) distribution of rms
Receipt Size of Manufacturing Establishments (in millions of dollars)
Total 0-0.99 1-4.99 5-9.99 10-49.99 50+
Establishments 344,341 177,099 78,026 19,774 25,893 43,549
51.4% 22.7% 5.7% 7.5% 12.6%
Receipts ($000) 3,937,164,576 56,607,235 173,543,614 122,826,132 361,399,818 3,222,847,777
1.4% 4.4% 3.1% 9.2% 81.9%
Mean 11,434
Source : Based on Census Bureau 2002 tabulated data prepared by the SBA.
The xed cost Cf is selected to t an exit rate of 10% (taken from Bartelsman, Scarpetta
and Shivardi, 2003) given a normalized nal good price p = 1; and the level for the sunk entry
cost Cde was selected so as to satisfy the free entry condition of manufacturers. In addition, the
value for xed cost, Cuf , as well as the entry cost, C
u
e , of suppliers were assumed to be equal to
the xed cost Cf and entry cost of manufacturers, respectively.
The extra managerial cost for a vertically integrated manufacturer, , and the investment
cost, h, were chosen to match a share of 8 to 9 % of vertically integrated rms and a share
of linked rms 25%, respectively.18 And nally, the value for the relative weight of z in cost
18Uzzi (1996) studies the Womens Dress industry where manufacturers and contractors are linked by long-term
ongoing relationships. He nds that about 25 percent of the manufacturers have networks composed of 5 or fewer
exchange partners; 30 percent have exchanges with 5 to 12 partners, while about 40 percent maintain business
ties with more than 20 contractors. We take a value of 25% for our calibration given that in our model each
manufacturer is supplied with just one supplier. Notice that the exercise we will perform in the following section
is to decrease the persistence of the z shocks and look at what happen with the number and share of VI and L
rms. And the value of the H 0s parameters determines the sensitivity of the decision rules to the persistence of z.
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complementarity, , was chosen so as to t the percentage of median sized manufacturing plants
that are vertically integrated.19 Table 5 shows the calibration results. It can be seen that
the annual exit rate, the share of vertically integrated and linked rms, and the percentage of
vertically integrated plants in the median-sized plants are well tted, while the t of the size
distribution of rms can be improved (Figure 7).
Table 5: Data moments and model moments.
Model Data
Share of rms by size
(revenues in millions of U.S. dollars)
0-0.99 56.4% 51.4%
1-4.99 40.2% 22.7%
5-9.99 3.1% 5.7%
10-49.99 0.4% 7.5%
50+ 0.0% 12.6%
Annual exit rate 8.6% 10%
Share of Linked rms 25.7% 25%
Share of vertically integrated rms 8.4% 8%-9%
Share of vertically integrated median-sized rms 5.2% 7%
Figure 7. Size distribution of rms:
0-0.99 1-4.99 5-9.99 10-49.99 50+
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Revenue Distribution of Firms
Revenues
Data
Model
19The share of VI plants, as well as the percent of the median-sized plants that are integrated, were taken from
Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009), as exposed in the introduction.
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3.2 Benchmark Economy
3.2.1 Equilibrium decision rules, revenue distribution of rms and vertical rela-
tions.
Figure 8 shows the policy functions of a standardized rm. The associated values of the
decision rule are as follows. The number 1 represents exit the industry, 2 stay in the industry
and get a new draw of supplier (continue being standardized), 3 stay in the industry and set up
a link, and 4 stay in the industry and become vertically integrated.
Figure 8. Policy function of a standardized rm.
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In gure 9 we expose the same policy function as in gure 8 but in the (z; ") plane. Thus,
it shows the same results derived from the theoretical section 2.3, and, in particular, the issues
exposed in gure 5. The areas plotted in Figure 9 correspond to the characterization of the
decision rules made in Propositions 1 and 2.
The numbers inside each cell of Figure 9 are the numbers (and corresponding decisions) that
indicate the height of the surface plotted in Figure 8. Cells containing the same number dene
the vertical status for di¤erent rms. Besides, the least e¢ cient rms decide to exit the industry.
As it was explained in section 2, rms with pairs of productivity levels below the set of thresholds
S exit the industry (area indicated by cells containing number 1). Manufacturer rms that are
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e¢ cient but matched with ine¢ cient suppliers decide to continue active and get a new draw for
next period (area indicated by cells containing number 2).
The most e¢ cient manufacturer rms (the ones with highest levels of z) decide to become
vertically integrated when they are matched with e¢ cient suppliers. There are some manufac-
turers with intermediate productivity levels, which have drawn an e¢ cient supplier, and decide
to keep the same supplier by setting up a link (number 3-area). The increasing di¤erences in
cost function generates the correlation of types for high productivity levels.
Figure 9. Policy function of a standardized rm.
Figure 10 shows the decision rules of a vertically integrated rm and has the same inter-
pretations as before. A particularly interesting point here is that the model generates vertical
disintegration of plants. Moreover, identical manufacturers may di¤er in their vertical struc-
ture, and those that are vertically integrated can end up disintegrated or remain integrated.
For example, taking a rm with high z-productivity and an intermediate upper level for ", start
decreasing the level for z and keep " xed (given that " does not evolve over time). Then if its
z-productivity decreases enough over time, this manufacturer will decides to disintegrate and
become linked, outsourcing the input production. Furthermore, if it productivity continues to
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decrease, it may decide to change supplier or exit the industry.
Figure 10. Policy function of a VI rm.
To summarize, we can see that our model induces the following behavior of rms. Vertically
integrated manufacturer rms are larger and more e¢ cient on average. Big and e¢ cient stan-
dardized manufacturers that seek to expand though vertical integration choose suppliers that
are also large and e¢ cient as found in Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009).
In equilibrium the model generates some big manufacturers that are not vertically inte-
grated, in line with the fact exposed in Figure 1. In Figure 11, panel A presents the equilibrium
size (revenue) distribution of manufacturing plants20. The line with triangles represents the
total size distribution of rms, while the other lines represent, for each size, the proportion of
each type of rm (S, VI, L and Entrants) to the total share of rms for each particular size (this
is, the area below each line adds up to the share of each category in the total number of plants).
20Figure 11 excludes the highest values for z so as to present a better exposition of the distributions at the
lowest productivity levels. Figure 12 presents the whole range of the log of z.
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Panel B shows the same picture in logarithmic scale.
Figure 11. Size distribution of rms.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
Revenues
Revenue Distribution of Firms
Total Size Distr. of Firms
S.D. of S Firms
S.D. of L Firms
S.D. of VI Firms
S.D. of Entrants
A-Revenue distribution of rms.
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
Log(Revenues)
Revenue Distribution of Firms
Total Size Distr. of Firms
S.D. of S Firms
S.D. of L Firms
S.D. of VI Firms
S.D. of Entrants
B-Revenue dist. of rms (log. scale).
Notice that there is an overlap between these distributions: downstream rms with the same
high z-productivity levels di¤er in their vertical structure in the steady state. The explanation
for this, according to our model, is that some e¢ cient manufacturers decide not to become
vertically integrated and instead get a new draw while still looking for a more e¢ cient supplier.
The previous two graphs show that the fraction of vertically integrated plants increases with
the plant size. In addition, it can also be seen that vertically integrated rms dominates (in
rst order stochastic dominance sense) to the size distribution of not vertically integrated rms.
This last fact is exposed better in Figure 12 which presents just the size distribution of vertically
integrated and not vertically integrated manufacturing plants (now each line is the share of plants
as a proportion of all plants in a particular vertical structure -the total area below each line
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adds up to one-).
Figure 12. Size distribution of vertically integrated and not
vertically integrated manufacturers.
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3.3 How does the model work?
The model economy presented above, gives rise to rich industry dynamics as manufacturer
enter, exit and decide how to obtain their inputs. In this environment an industrial structure
emerges as the result of optimal investment decisions that rms undertake under uncertainty.
Di¤erences across industries that a¤ect rmsincentives to use the VI or L margins determine
rm level TFP dynamics and have an impact on protability, survival, size distribution of rms
and average productivity of an industry. In the following sections we use the model to addresses
the questions on why supply relations vary across industries and across rms within industries,
and how these relations a¤ect size distribution of rms, turnover, mobility, welfare, aggregate
output and productivity.
3.3.1 Bargaining power and vertical structure
In this section we analyze the e¤ect of changes in the bargaining power of the manufacturer
(Table 6). When the bargaining power of the manufacturer increases, downstream rms face a
less severe hold-up problem. The average specialized input price, pLu (), decreases from 1:39 to
1:17, which leads the manufacturers to become linked instead of vertically integrated. As it can
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be seen in the table, the share of vertically integrated rms decreases and the share of linked ones
increases (the mass of vertically integrated and linked rms reacts in the same direction). The
slight decline in the nal good price from 1 to 0:98, that yields an increase in consumer surplus,
together with a reduction in the average specialized input price, which generates an increase
in producer surplus, yields a higher aggregate welfare. Furthermore, as the total investment
increases, TFP increases.
Table 6: Changes in bargaining power

0:5 0:6 0:7
Price 1:00 0:99 0:98
Exit Rate 0:09 0:08 0:08
Agg. Output 100:0 100:0 100:4
TFP 100:0 102:1 103:3
Welfare 100:0 100:2 101:0
Consumer surplus 100:0 100:0 100:9
Producer surplus 100:0 100:9 105:7
Share of Vertically Integrated Firms
V I
Total F irms 0:084 0:072 0:071
V I
L 0:328 0:238 0:204
3.3.2 Costs of VI and L and vertical structure
Lets now focus on the specic investment cost, h. An increase in h generates a decline in
the value at entry of manufacturers, and this leads to a higher nal good price, lower output
(thus lower consumer surplus), and higher exit rate (Table 7). As the cost of becoming linked
is higher, relative to becoming vertically integrated, the ratio VI to L rises.
Despite the increase in the exit rate, there is a decline in TFP. The lower TFP level is caused
by a decrease in the TFP of suppliers. Given that small and medium sized manufacturers use
links more intensively relative to VI, the increase in h has a big impact on this group of rms.
In addition, as small and medium sized manufacturers are more selective in the " they choose
to invest in, this leads to lower RTFP of suppliers (from 1.8 to 1.6). In line with this reasoning,
it can be seen that some rms that invested in L, now do not invest at all, and some other ones
invest in VI, as shown by the increase in the percentage of median-sized rms that invest in VI
from 0:052 to 0:064. As a result, even though there is higher selection, TFP decreases, producer
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surplus decreases and total welfare decreases.
Table 7: Changes in specic investment and VI xed costs:
h 
1:3 1:4 1:5 3:15 3:25 3:35
Price 1:00 1:01 1:03 1:00 1:00 1:00
Exit rate 0:086 0:091 0:091 0:086 0:090 0:09
Agg. Output 100:0 98:9 97:9 100:0 100:0 100:0
TFP 100:0 99:1 97:6 100:0 101:4 101:4
Welfare 100:0 97:5 95:1 100:0 100:0 100:0
Consumer surplus 100:0 97:7 95:4 100:0 100:0 100:0
Producer surplus 100:0 91:9 84:2 100:0 99:9 99:6
Share of Vertically Integrated Firms
V I
Total F irms 0:084 0:090 0:096 0:084 0:062 0:060
V I
L 0:328 0:427 0:589 0:328 0:251 0:242
When the additional managerial xed cost of a vertically integrated manufacturer () in-
creases, the share of vertically integrated rms, as well as the ratio of vertically integrated to
linked rms, decreases (Table 7). Furthermore, the increase in the xed cost of a vertically
integrated rm does not seem to have an e¤ect on the value at entry of manufacturers, because
the possibility to become a big vertically integrated rm is strongly discounted upon entry.
Therefore, the equilibrium price remain the same as before (so does the consumer surplus), but
the exit rate increases. In addition, the TFP increases a bit while producer surplus slightly
decreases. Thus there is no e¤ect on total welfare.
3.3.3 Complementarity and vertical structure
When T1 increases, it increases the complementarity between manufacturer and suppliers
type making the e¤ects of cost reducing investment more important, thus the mass of rms
that become vertically integrated and linked increases (Table 8). The exit rate decreases and
it is cheaper to invest and thus to survive. The larger proportion of ine¢ cient rms o¤sets the
original decline in costs, thus the TFP decreases. Finally, total welfare increases.
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Table 8: Changes in complementarity.
T1 T2 
70 75 80  0:5 0 0:5 0:45 0:47 0:49
Price 1:02 1:00 0:97 1:06 1:00 0:838 1:00 1:00 0:99
Exit rate 0:090 0:086 0:086 0:093 0:086 0:072 0:090 0:086 0:088
Agg. Output 100:0 102:1 104:4 100:0 105:3 122:7 100:0 100:5 101:1
TFP 100:0 97:9 95:8 100:0 101:0 103:6 100:0 100:3 98:6
Welfare 100:0 104:8 109:9 100:0 112:6 158:1 100:0 101:3 102:4
Consumer surplus 100:0 104:8 110:0 100:0 112:2 157:1 100:0 101:2 102:4
Producer surplus 100:0 104:8 106:0 100:0 128:8 208:0 100:0 105:6 101:0
Share of VI
V I
Total F irms 0:058 0:084 0:103 0:047 0:084 0:107 0:077 0:084 0:104
V I
L 0:235 0:328 0:431 0:294 0:328 0:233 0:331 0:328 0:480
The increase in T2 generates an increase in the value at entry, which makes the equilibrium
nal good price and exit rate lower. When T1 increases, every manufacturer increases VI and
L with less e¢ cient suppliers. In contrast, when T2 increases it is the least e¢ cient active
manufacturers that were in the margin of setting up links and becoming vertically integrated
the ones that start playing an important role in the total investment. As explained above, in
gure 5, these group of manufacturers are more selective with respect to the supplier they choose
to become vertically integrated or linked. They have to nd a very e¢ cient supplier in order
to do so. Thus, an increase in T2 generates an increase in TFP, in contrast with what happens
when T1 increases.21
The parameter  indicates how important is the manufacturers type, z, relative to suppliers
type, ", in the e¤ect of the cost reducing investment. If  increases it is less important than
before, in terms of reductions in variable cost, how e¢ cient is the supplier. Thus, when 
increases it makes manufacturers less selective on the type of supplier they choose to invest in
VI and L. As a result TFP decreases. In addition, the share of vertically integrated to linked
manufacturers increases. Moreover, as it is easier to become more productive when linking or
becoming vertically integrated (it depends less on how e¢ cient is the supplier), the value at
entry increases and the equilibrium price decreases. The decline in nal good price leads to an
increase in total production and consumer surplus. Finally, total welfare increases.
21The RTFP of suppliers increases from 1:6 to 2:2.
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3.3.4 Discount factor and vertical structure
With respect to a change in the discount factor, as rms value more the future they have
more incentives to invest, thus the total investment in VI and L increases (the measure of
vertically integrated and linked rms rise), and the share of rms using specialized inputs in-
creases (Table 9). As the value at entry increases, the equilibrium nal good price decreases
and consumer surplus increases. Given that there is less selection, in equilibrium there are more
ine¢ cient rms active in the industry, and TFP decreases. Furthermore, as the decrease in
TFP does not seems to have a big impact on aggregate protability, the total producer surplus
increases and, as a result, total welfare increases.
Table 9: Changes in discount factor.

0:95 0:96 0:97
Price 1:08 1:00 0:913
Exit Rate 0:090 0:086 0:083
Agg. Output 100:0 107:5 116:3
TFP 100:0 95:5 90:9
Welfare 100:0 117:0 138:7
Consumer surplus 100:0 117:3 139:6
Producer surplus 100:0 103:0 104:4
Share of Vertically Integrated Firms
V I
Total F irms 0:078 0:084 0:091
V I
L 0:342 0:328 0:341
3.3.5 Fixed entry and production costs and vertical structure
When manufacturers xed cost of production is higher, the equilibrium price increases and
consumer surplus decreases (Table 10). The exit rate increases, which generates an increase in
TFP. An increase in the xed cost of suppliers has similar e¤ects. In both cases total welfare
decreases.
The e¤ect of changes in entry costs of manufacturers and suppliers is as follows (Table 10 and
11). When Cde increases, the equilibrium price increases and production, as well as consumer
surplus, decreases. The increase in price generates more investments in VI, in particular by
small rms (the percentage of median sized manufacturing plants that are vertically integrated
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increases). There is also a relative increase in the share of big rms. This explains the rise in
TFP. Although there is an increase in TFP, producer surplus decreases due to the decline of
entry and the total mass of rms.
Table 10: Changes in xed costs and entry costs.
Cf C
u
f C
d
e
0:35 0:40 0:45 0:35 0:40 0:45 2:5 3:0 3:5
Price 0:96 1:00 1:04 0:96 1:00 1:04 0:93 1:00 1:07
Exit rate 0:08 0:08 0:09 0:08 0:08 0:09 0:08 0:08 0:09
Agg. Output 100:0 96:77 93:28 100:0 96:77 93:28 100:0 94:06 88:40
TFP 100:0 102:13 102:41 100:0 95:04 89:45 100:0 105:32 108:18
Welfare 100:0 93:19 85:87 100:0 93:19 85:85 100:0 87:70 76:52
Consumer surplus 100:0 92:99 85:70 100:0 92:99 85:70 100:0 87:34 76:09
Producer surplus 100:0 102:81 93:71 100:0 102:81 92:74 100:0 106:46 98:93
Share of VI
V I
Total F irms 0:087 0:084 0:086 0:087 0:084 0:085 0:084 0:084 0:093
V I
L 0:219 0:257 0:220 0:219 0:257 0:217 0:223 0:257 0:210
A rise in the entry cost of suppliers induces an increase in the standardized input price
(from 0:42 to 0:46). Thus, there is an increase the exit rate of manufacturers and in the nal
good price which yields a decline in consumer surplus. The increase in the standardized input
price induces an increase in VI and a decline in L.
Table 11: Changes in entry costs.
Cue
2:5 3:0 3:5
Price 0:97 1:00 1:025
Exit Rate 0:08 0:08 0:09
Agg. Output 100:0 97:85 95:80
TFP 100:0 101:48 101:30
Welfare 100:0 95:41 90:95
Consumer surplus 100:0 95:30 90:92
Producer surplus 100:0 100:20 92:36
Share of Vertically Integrated Firms
V I
Total F irms 0:084 0:084 0:093
V I
L 0:257 0:257 0:210
42
3.4 Idiosyncratic productivity shocks and vertical structure
In our theoretical framework we have three di¤erent types of manufacturer rms. First, a stan-
dardized manufacturer, which has no variable costs advantage relative to vertically integrated
and linked rms. It is not subject to Hold-up and has lower xed costs relative with a vertically
integrated rm. Thus it performs better when facing negative shocks.
Second, a linked rm. It uses specialized inputs and is subject to Hold-up problem. It
performs better than a vertically integrated manufacturer rm when negative shocks are realized
(avoid higher xed costs and bound losses).
And third, a vertically integrated rm which has the lowest variable costs. It is not subject
to Hold-up. In addition, it pays higher xed costs and requires higher investment costs (h+PV I ,
which in equilibrium is much higher than h), then perform worst with negative shocks.
In this section we want to address the following question: what is the implication of making
the evolution of the manufacturers productivity shocks less persistent? In table 12 we present
the comparative statics results. It shows the e¤ect of decreasing the persistence of shocks, ; on
the vertical relation of the industry. By comparing the rst column with the other ones, it can
be seen that the share of vertically integrated manufacturers to linked ones decreases, as well
as the share of vertically integrated manufacturers, while the mass of vertically integrated rms
decreases and the measure of linked ones increases. Moreover, the share of rms that invest in
using specialized inputs, (V I + L)=Total F irms, increases.
Because of cost reducing investment through VI are less attractive when there is a decline in
the persistence, manufacturers value at entry decreases. Hence the equilibrium price increases.
As a result, the equilibrium output decreases and consumer surplus is lower. In addition, the
increase in nal good price generates a lower exit rate. Despite the lower selection, there is an
increase in producer surplus and total factor productivity (TFP) due to the fact that e¢ cient
manufacturers that invest in the use of specialized inputs become more selective about suppliers
type. In other words, in order to invest in VI or L, manufacturers wait more until they get
matched with a better supplier. Thus suppliers productivity increases.22 ;23 Finally, as the
decline in consumer surplus is bigger than the increase in producer surplus, the total welfare
22See the appendix for denitions of total factor productivity (TFP) and revenue TFP (RTFP).
23Revenue TFP of suppliers increases signicantly, from 1.8 to 2.1, while the RTFP of manufacturers does not
change.
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decreases.24
Table 12: Changes in persistence and variance of shocks.
 2
0:93 0:92 0:91 0:13 0:15 0:17
Price 1:00 1:08 1:11 0:90 1:0 0:99
Exit rate 0:09 0:06 0:06 0:05 0:086 0:092
Agg. Output 100:0 93:6 91:4 100:0 91:3 92:3
TFP 100:0 104:2 108:4 100:0 98:7 93:8
Welfare 100:0 86:8 82:9 100:0 81:2 82:5
Consumer surplus 100:0 86:5 81:9 100:0 81:9 83:9
Producer surplus 100:0 112:6 132:8 100:0 60:0 39:7
Share vertically integrated Firms
V I
Total F irms 0:084 0:062 0:059 0:130 0:084 0:041
V I
L 0:328 0:206 0:152 0:308 0:328 0:385
If  is high, rms anticipate that high shocks today will be around for long time. Thus,
by becoming vertically integrated, they strongly discount the realization of a low shock (while
paying high xed costs). Therefore, many rms decide to become vertically integrated.
In contrast, if  is low, there is higher mobility across productivity states and the expected
duration of being in a high idiosyncratic e¢ ciency level is lower. There is a higher possibility of
having a low shock relatively soon, incurring high losses (due to high xed production costs) or
not recovering the investment cost (h+ PV I). As a result, manufacturers become more exible,
which is reected by a lower VI to L ratio and a decrease in the share of vertically integrated
rms.
To summarize, as found in Kranton and Minehart (2000), our result indicates that the
properties of the idiosyncratic risk at rm level plays an important role in determining the
vertical structure of rms. The choice of manufacturers between VI and link is nontrivial.
24Total welfare is the sum of consumer and producer surplus, which is calculated as follows:
Welfare =
AY 
1+B
1 +B
  pY  +
X
z
X
"
h
Sd (z; ")
S(z; ") + Ld (z; ")
L(z; ")
+V Id (z; ")
V I(z; ") + Su(z; ")
S(z; ") + Lu (z; ")
L(z; ")
i
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It follows from the trade-o¤ between loosing exibility against negative shocks and sharing a
fraction of prots with the supplier.
As the variance 2 increases, given that the per period prot is concave in z, the value at
entry is lower. Hence the equilibrium price increases and consumer surplus shows a large decline.
A higher dispersion in productivity shocks implies that there are entrants with e¢ ciency levels
within a wider range of values. The most ine¢ cient ones exit while the most e¢ cient ones survive
(each one of which contributes more to total production than before). Thus, there are two forces
that diminishes the total number of rms. First, the higher equilibrium prices generates a decline
in demand, and therefore there is less space for production units in the market. And second,
there are bigger production units that satisfy the lower quantity demanded. What is interesting
here is that, even though there is a reallocation of resources from small to medium and big rms
(looking at the size distribution of rms, there is an increase in the share of big rms and a
decline in the share of small ones), which increases the RTFP of manufacturers, the big decline
in total investment (the share, as well as the mass, of rms that become vertically integrated
and linked decreases) generates lower suppliers RTFP. As a result, the total RTFP (and TFP)
decreases. In line with this, producer surplus is lower, hence total welfare decreases.
4 Conclusion
This paper proposes a dynamic entry and exit model of an industry with vertical structure
decisions and specic investments. In the model, the industrial vertical structure is the result
of optimal investment decisions that rms make under uncertainty. The model does well in
replicating new facts on vertical structures documented in Hortaçsu and Syverson (2009) and
Kranton and Minehart (2000). Our results indicate that di¤erences in vertical structures across
industries, and across rms within industries, are the result of di¤erences in the properties of
the stochastic process governing the uncertainty at rm level, in specic investment costs, in
bargaining power of manufacturers and suppliers, and in complementarity of manufacturers and
suppliers productivity.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Solution Method
The algorithm to compute the equilibrium is as follows:
1) Given initial guesses for the price of the nal good, p0; and for the standardized input price,
p0u, compute the price for the specialized input, p
L0
u (z; "); by NBS over current prots, that
is, taking
pL0u = pu   (1  )c(z; ");
as the solution of expression (8), and take HV I as
p0V Iz }| {
pu  Cuf
1   + h. Take these prices as the
initial guesses for pL0u and p
0
V I
2) Take an initial guess for the density of productivity of manufacturers looking for a stan-
dardized suppliers Jd0 (z),
3) Obtain policy functions aS(); x0S(); aL(); aV I(); x0V I() and value functions ; V S();
V V I(); V L(); WS() and WL() (equations 1; 3; 4; 5, and 7).
4) Compute the price for the specialized input, pLu (z; ") by NBS taking into account the
continuation values (equation 8) and PV I(z; ") = Ez0;"0WS(z0; "0; p; pu).
5) Compare pLu (z; ) and PV I(z; ") with previous guesses p
L0
u (z; ) and P
0
V I(z; "):
i) If they are close)guess a new specialized input price, taking:
pL0u (z; ) = p
L0
u (z; ") + (p
L
u (z; ")  pL0u (z; ")); and
P 0V I(z; ") = P
0
V I(z; ") + (PV I(z; ")  P 0V I(z; "));
where  is a convergence tolerance parameter, and repeat from point (3):
ii) If they are close)compute for each price pLu (z; ") and pV I(z; ") the gains from trade
for manufacturers and suppliers that trade inputs:
 If for some (z; ") gains from trade are negative)use an indicator so that under
these prices the manufacturer decides not to negotiate, and repeat from point (3)
using these new prices.
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 If for every (z; ") gains from trade are positive)stop and go to next point.
6) Use the computed decision rules and the transition matrix to compute the invariant density
of productivity of manufacturers looking for a standardized suppliers Jd(z), and compare
it with Jd0 (z) :
i) If they are not close)guess a new one (Jd0 (z) = Jd(z)) and repeat from point (2)
until they get close.
ii) If they are close)stop and go to next point .
7) Compute V de (pu; p) and W
u
e (pu; p) and given the entry costs C
d
e and C
u
e verify if free entry
conditions (equations 10 and 11) hold:
i) If they do not hold:
 If V eu (pu) < Cue and/or W ue (pu) < Cue ) guess a new higher prices, p and pu by
bisection and repeat from point (1):
 If V eu (pu) > Cue and/or W ue (pu) > Cue ) guess a new lower prices, p and pu by
bisection and repeat from point (1):
ii) If V es (pu)  Cue and W ue (pu)  Cue )stop and go to next point.
8) Use the computed decision rules and the transition matrix to compute the xed points of
the distribution of manufacturer rm sizes when the mass of rms is one (md = 1). Thus,
we have the xed points bS ; bV I and bL:
9) Use the linear homogeneity of the T 0s operators (dened in point vi of the stationary
equilibrium denition, in equations 16, 17 and 18) in md to obtain the equilibrium value
for md that satises the market clearing condition for the nal good: Dd(p) = Sd(p;md):
5.2 Physical and revenue TFP
In this section I describe how the physical and revenue total factor productivity is calculated.
We denote physical and revenue total factor productivity as TFP and RTFP, respectively. The
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expression for the revenue TFP is as follows:
RTFP =
X
z
X
"
aS(z; ")
pz
pu+Cf
eS(z; ") +X
z
X
"
aL(z; ")
pz+c(z;")
pLu (z;")+Cf
eL(z; ")
+
X
z
X
"
aV I(z; ")
pz+c(z;")
Cf+C
V I
f
eV I(z; ") +X
z
X
"
pu
Cuf
eS(z; ")
+
X
z
X
"
pLu (z;")
Cuf
eL(z; ");
where the rst term represents the weighted average (the weight is the share of standardized
manufacturers in each state, eS(z; ")) of the ratio of standardized manufacturers revenues, pz,
to their total production cost, pu + Cf .
The second and third terms are the weighted average of the ratio of linked and vertically
integrated manufacturers revenues to their corresponding total production costs. In these caseseL(z; ") and eV I(z; ") are the share of linked and vertically integrated manufacturers, respec-
tively. In contrast with the rst term, in the numerator it appears the variable cost advantage
of specic investments, c(z; "). The other di¤erence is in the denominator, where it appears as
cost of the linked rms the bargained input price pLu (z; "); and for vertically integrated rms the
additional xed cost CV If .
The last two terms correspond to the RTFP of suppliers. There, eS(z; ") and eL(z; ") are
the share of standardized and linked suppliers, respectively. The fourth term is the RTFP of
a standardized supplier, which is the ratio of revenue, pu, to total cost, Cuf . For specialized
suppliers, the RTFP is similar, but their revenue is pLu (z,").
The expression for TFP is as follows
TFP =
X
z
X
"
aS(z; ")
z
1+
Cf
p
eS(z; ") +X
z
X
"
aL(z; ")
z+
c(z;")
p
1+
Cf
p
eL(z; ")
+
X
z
X
"
aV I(z; ")
z+
c(z;")
p
Cf+C
V I
f
p
eV I(z; ") +X
z
X
"
1
Cu
f
p
eS(z; ")
+
X
z
X
"
1
Cu
f
p
eL(z; ");
in which the di¤erence with the denition for RTFP is the following. For manufacturers, every
term reects the ratio of units produced by each rm to the units of all inputs they use in
production. Standardized and linked manufacturers use one unit of input to produce and Cfp
xed units of physical resources to produce z and z + c(z;")p units of nal goods, respectively.
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Every vertically integrated rm produces z + c(z;")p units of nal goods and uses
Cf+C
V I
f
p xed
units of physical resources to produce. The logic is the same for suppliers.
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